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Abstract 
The use of aggregate data and failure to consider all possible alternatives to bank 
loans have been the main sources of criticism of empirical bank lending channel 
analyses. Although in the recent literature firm aggregates have replaced macro 
aggregates, existence of a differential impact of monetary policy across firms is an 
issue still open to empirical confirmation. Aggregates ignore firm heterogeneity 
and implicitly assume, in the case of size subaggregates, that the only difference 
between small and large firms is their access to capital markets. This paper 
represents an attempts to improve the empirical analysis of the narrow credit 
channel by estimating the effect of monetary policy on the debt mix using a panel 
of individual firms, controlling for firm specific heterogeneity. Using a data set of 
12,909 Spanish firms provided by the Central Balance Sheet Office of the Bank of 
Spain, the estimates obtained support the existence of a bank lending channel 
during the 1983-1996 period. Monetary contractions during the period reduced 
the supply of bank loans relative to nonbank loans as evidenced by the 
significantly negative effect of an increase in the intervention rate on the financing 
mix of all firms. Furthermore, a differential impact of monetary policy is 
observed across firms according to their access to public capital markets, proxied 
by various variables, including employee size. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses one of the main criticisms of the empirical credit 
channel literature. Despite the clear microeconomic foundations of the existence 
of an additional channel for the transmission of monetary policy (see for example 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989), all evidence, thus far, stems from aggregate analysis. 
Initially tests relied on aggregate correlations or aggregate predictive power 
comparisons (King, 1986, Romer and Romer, 1990, Bemanke and Blinder, 1988, 
1992 and Ramey, 1993). More recently, studies have addressed the differences in 
financing patterns across firms by contrasting the effects of monetary policy on 
firm subtotals classified according to size (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1995». For skeptics of the credit channel, however, this division 
between classes of borrowers, large and small, is not an adequate representation 
of the information asymmetry models underlying the credit channel since not 
only is the classification between small and large ad hoc, but also considerable 
firm heterogeneity as well as possible feedbacks amongst firms are masked in 
these subaggregates. 
The results presented here show that at the firm level the credit channel continues 
to operate. It operates for all firms in the data base constructed by the Central 
Balance Sheet Office of the Bank of Spain (eBBE) and a differential effect is clearly 
distinguished between firms with and without access to capital markets. Whereas 
the usual identifying assumption behind subgroup comparisons is that, in the 
absence of credit market imperfections, small and large firms' response to a 
monetary contraction are identical, and that the only factor distinguishing them is 
the degree to which they face credit constraints (i.e. firms are small and large by 
accident), the use of firm level data allows other differences between large and 
small firms to be taken into account explicitly. By allowing for firm heterogeneity, 
including technological diversity, a differential response to monetary policy can 
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be more clearly imputed to financial differences. In addition by using individual 
data, finns are permitted to transit between constrained and unconstrained states 
across time. Thus a differential reaction between £inns can be more confidently 
used as evidence of an operative lending charmel. 
The main limitation of using firm level data is its periodicity. The eBBE data, as 
the Compustat data, is available only on an armual basis.1 This may encumber the 
task at hand, however, given that the effects of monetary policy shocks have been 
shown to persist for periods of up to four years, especially during the 1982-1995 
period (Estrada, Hernando and Valles, 1997), its effects should still be captured 
with annual data. 
After a brief literature review, the framework used in this paper to assess the 
existence of a credit channel mechanism in Spain shall be presented, followed by 
results and conclusions. 
2. Theory 
The narrow credit channel is centered around the special nature of banks. 
Although several factors have led to a decline in the special nature of bank loans 
(i.e. securitization of bank loans, reduction of monitoring and information costs 
and the increase of nonbank intermediaries)', banks still play a special role. In the 
aggregate, bank loans still represent approximately 45% of total credit in Spain 
and 33% in the US. In addition, evidence presented by Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), 
and Petersen and Rajan (1992) show many households and firms appearing to be 
bank dependent. 
1 Quarterly data encompassing around 600 firms representing a narrower rage of activities, sizes 
and ownerships, is available only since 1990 whereas the annual data encompasses some 6,000 
firms starting in 1983. 
� Attachment of derivatives to the securities of a finn, for example, can improve the supply and 
dissemination of information about the firm and lead to still more funding opportunities, reducing 
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According to this channel, monetary policy affects aggregate activity not only 
through interest rates but also by reducing the availability of credit to bank 
dependent firms. This channel is viable only under two conditions. First, the 
intermediary sector must not be able to completely insulate its lending activities 
from shocks to reserves. Banks must not be able to compensate the reduction in 
demand deposits by either raising loanable funds not subject to reserve 
requirements or selling off assets. Romer and Romer (1990) have argued that this 
condition does not hold since banks are able to avoid a fall in their liabilities by 
raising other loanable funds not subject to reserve requirements. The second 
condition requires borrowers to be unable to fully insulate their spending when 
faced with a tightening of the credit supply. 
If the lending view is correct, monetary policy can have important effects on 
investment and aggregate activity without altering open market rates. In this 
manner, the scant interest rate sensitivity of aggregate investment in Spain would 
be at least partially explained. In addition, an important implication of the narrow 
credit channel is that monetary policy should have a disproportionate impact on 
borrowers with limited access to capital markets, all else equal. In other words, 
monetary policy may have undesired distributional consequences. 
The main evidence supporting the existence of a narrow credit charmel in the US 
stems from Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993). 
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox look at the relative movements in bank loans and 
commercial paper after monetary shocks. They find that shifts in monetary policy 
alter the mix of loans and commercial paper and that these induced shifts in the 
mix appear to affect investment. However, when Oliner and Rudebusch (1995) 
repeat the analysis comparing the effect of monetary policy on the debt mix of 
small and large firms, accounting for movements in all types of debt finance (not 
the importance of the credit channel 
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only short term debt), they find that monetary shocks do not change the 
composition of bank and nonbank debt for either large or small firms. Instead 
they find that all types of credit are redirected from small to large firms in 
response to a monetary contraction. Gertler and Gilchrist, on the other hand, 
found that small firms contracted substantially relative to large firms after tight 
money and they attempted to show that mainly financial factors were at work. 
Hernando (1998) used an approach similar to KSW using Spanish aggregate data 
. and found that tight monetary policy had a negative effect on the debt mix (bank 
loans as percentage of bank loans and commercial paper), yet this effect was no 
longer significant once the period of credit constraints was taken into account. 
The author also found that the relative price of bank loans increased after tight 
monetary policy, even after controlling for the credit constraints. 
3. Empirical Framework 
The fact that two conditions operating on different agents are necessary for the 
bank lending channel to operate implies that evidence from bank balance sheets is 
inconclusive. The movement of bank and nonbank loans on firms' balance sheets 
after a monetary policy shock must also be compared. The key assumption behind 
this analysis is that the usual interest rate channel reduces finnst demand for bank 
loans and other debt to an equal degree. Thus a decline of bank loans relative to 
. other debt outst�nding can be taken as evidence of a reduction in bank loan 
supply. 
The basic intuition behind this test of the lending channel can be formalized in a 
simple model (KSW, 1993) that will allow the introduction of firm specific 
charaderistics. Given a predetermined external funds requirement, the firm 
selects the optimal mix of bank (B) and nonbank (N) debt to minimize its cost of 
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debt finance. Assuming a price clearing mechanism in the debt market3, firms face 
a given interest Ib on bank loans and rn on nonbank loans. In addition to this 
direct interest cost, finns perceive a benefit from maintaining close bank ties (R) 
and this benefit in turn depends on the share of bank loans. For a given amount of 
total debt, the benefit rises with the bank loan share subject to diminishing 
returns. Several theories, supported by empirical evidence, explain why firms 
may prefer to finance themselves at least partially with higher rate bank loans. 
Given the higher degree of monitoring, firms may be able to obtain bank funds, 
for example, even when adverse selection problems would make it difficult to 
raise funds in the public market. 
The firm1s choice problem is 
Min C=IbB + rnN-R 
s.t. B + N = D 
R=f (BID) * D 
(1) 
where f is an increasing concave function ( f  I > 0 and £ " < 0), D represents total 
debt and R the "relationship" benefit the firm derives from bank borrowing. The 
first order conditions for B and N imply: 
n ,-rn = f '( BID) (2) 
Because f ' is positive, the interest rate spread Ib - rn must be greater than zero for 
(2) to hold. This equation implies that any shock (e.g. monetary policy) that 
disturbs the relative cost of bank and nonbank loans will be reflected in a shift of 
the firm's financing mix. If a tightening of monetary policy reduces the supply of 
bank loans rdative to nonbank loans, the spread of rb over rn would widen, 
causing the optimal debt mix to fall. If, on the contrary, a monetary contraction 
1 The true price of bank loans however is imperfectly observable in part due to the widespread 
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had no effect on relative loan supplies, both the spread rb - rn and the debt mix 
would be unchanged. 
Using data for the Spanish economy, Hernando (1998) found that increases of the 
intervention rate lead to a widening of the bank loan - commercial paper rate 
spread. However, tests based on the response of the spread to changes in 
monetary policy are not conclusive in and of themselves for two reasons. First, as 
mentioned previously, the true bank loan rate is difficult to measure accurately. 
Second, the spread can be affected by factors other than increases in the 
intervention rate such as increasing default probabilities during recessions. Tests 
based on firms' financing choices, which do not require measurement of bank 
loan rates, are therefore a perfect complement to the spread tests when attempting 
to determine the response of bank loan supplies to changes in monetary policy. 
Availability of firm level data allows the above specification to be enriched with 
firm level characteristics. In particular, the relationship benefit the firm derives 
from bank borrowing will depend of the firm's possible access to public capital 
markets. Oliner and Rudebusch (1995) tried to approximate these differences by 
estimating the response on different firm samples. The approach here will be to 
take into account specific firm characteristics that are traditionally considered to 
determine a firms access to capital markets - i.e. size, ties with financial 
conglomerates and partial foreign ownership. R would then be given by Rit = f 
(BID) it * Dit· Zit where Zit is a vector of firm characteristics which may determine 
its access to public capital markets and which may vary over time. Letting MP 
denote the stance of monetary policy and differentiating the first order condition 
with respect to MP yields 
d ( B/D)"I d MP, = d (lb- rn)1 d MP,' [f"( BID ) ;, ' Z,,]-, (3) 
use of nonprice rationing. 
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Equation (3) shows that the optimal debt mix, BID, moves inversely with the 
spread between the interest rates on bank loans and nonbank debt. Only if a 
monetary contraction reduces the supply of bank loans relative to nonbank loans, 
leading to a widening of the spread n, - r", would the optimal debt mix fall in 
response. The presence of Z it in (3) captures the possible existence of a differential 
impact of monetary policy, an issue still open to empirical confirmation. 
The econometric model that results from the above framework and which is the 
basis of the results presented next is 
where Yi are firm fixed effects which shall be induded to control for firm specific 
factors such as technological differences that may affect the optimal debt mix 
independently from monetary policy. As an indicator of the stance of monetary 
policy the intervention rate set by the Bank of Spain is used. The variables used as 
proxies for firm characteristics which may affect the access to public capital 
markets are size, measured according to the number of employees, partial foreign 
or financial intermediary ownership, registration in the stock exchange, dividend 
distribution, and use of commercial paper. 
4. Empirical Evidence 
4.1. Data 
The firm-level data in this study were obtained from the Central Balance Sheet 
Office of the Bank of Spain. The initial data base included 18,814 firms over the 
1983-1996 period. The main advantage of using this data base is that it contains 
detailed annual income and balance sheet information for non-financial firms in a 
wide range of sectors. Aside from its periodicity, the main limitation of the 
-\3-
eSBE database is the relative weight of large-sized firms, public sector companies, 
electric utilities and, in general, firms with a large volume of fixed assets.4 
4.2. Selection Criteria 
Only firms with positive total debt, sales and workers and at least two 
consecutive observations are included in the sample used for estimation. This 
reduces the number of firm-years from 91,119 in the original sample to 67,216. The 
total amount of firms is reduced by close to 30% to 12,909. Table 1 lists the 
number of firms per year and describes the balance of the panel. Slightly over 40% 
of the firms have a maximum of three consecutive observations. Only 11 % of the 
firms have more than 10 observations, thus although T is large, for the majority of 
the firms, the time series dimension is rather smalL 
Rather than concentrating only on manufacturing firms, as most previous work 
on large and small firms has done, the sample contains firms in all nonfinancial 
sectors. Table 2 presents the sectoral decomposition of the data. Total 
manufacturing represents close to 50% of the sample and its gross value added is 
approximately 38% of the total national manufacturing value added. However, 
other sectors also have high individual sample representation - trade (23%), real 
estate (8%) and construction (6%), although these represent a lower percentage of 
the sectoral gross value added.s 
• In 1994, 77% of the sample's gross value added originated in 434 firms with more than'SOO 
workers. In the same year, 37% of the sample's gross valued added corresponded to 392 publicly 
owned firms and 83% of total workers were permanent. 
s Sector Sample Coverage of Sectoral Gross Value Added (1993) 
Extraction Industries 29.2% 
Manufacturing 37.8% 
Food, Beverage&Tobacco 28.1% 
Petroleum 51.7% 
Chemical 55.7% 
Other Fabricated Metals 35.0% 
Electronics 
Automobiles 
Other 
Prod. and Dist. of Elect., Gas and Water 
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44.1% 
80.8% 
21.8% 
98.5% 
The CBBE disaggregates debt into financial intermediary loans (banks and 
savings institutions), bonds and other tradeable assets, and other nonbank debt. 
Bank debt and all other nonbank debt are, in turn, split by maturity into short 
tenn debt (which has an original maturity of one year or less) and long tenn debt. 
The CBBE also provides data on trade credit, accounts payable and account 
receivable. Accounts payable are an important form of short-term debt. In 1996 
trade debt represented 28% of all credit received by nonfinancial firms 
(Hernandez and Hernando, 1998). Consequently one of the measures of debt mix 
utilized includes accounts payable. Unfortunately, however, the identity of the 
lender of trade debt is unknown. It would have been interesting to detennine 
whether, in response to tight monetary policy, firms not affected by the decrease 
of bank loans act as intermediaries extending trade credit to the most affected 
firms. 
Before examining the response of bank and nonbank debt mix to monetary 
shocks, it is useful to describe the composition of debt both for the total sample 
and across different size percentiles. Table 3 summarizes the average composition 
of debt across different size categories for the 1983 - 1996 period. Bank loans 
represent over 60% of total debt for the complete sample and across all size 
categories, with the exception of firms with real sales in the first quartile. 
Furthermore short tenn bank loans dominate for both small and medium sized 
firms, regardless of the size measure. On average bonds represent 22% of total 
loans. However, for small and medium firms they represent only 6.5% and 10% 
respectively. When firms are grouped according to the value of real sales, the 
percentage of bonds varies less and non-monotonically across the different 
categories. The remaining debt, composed mainly of loans with other firms and 
Construction 
Trade 
Transp. and Communication 
Other 
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12.4% 
14.2% 
58.2% 
23.2% 
trade debt acquired from providers of fixed assets, amounts on average to 16% of 
total debt. This percentage however decreases with size, both measured in terms 
of employees and of real sales. Overall small and medium sized firms are much 
more dependent on short term debt than large firms. Total debt for the first two 
categories is roughly split in half between long and short term while the ratio for 
large firms is approximately! to 4 (0.28). 
The bottom part of Table 3 summarizes the various mix variables. Two sets of 
debt ratios are calculated for both the short and long run. The first measure 
(DBR2) is simply the ratio of short-term bank debt to the sum of this debt plus 
bonds and other short term debt. The second measure (DBR4) allows an even 
wider range of substitutions between bank and nonbank finance by including 
trade debt in the denominator. The inclusion of trade debt in the mix variable is 
justified by its relative importance as a source of short term credit and by the 
belief that it functions as an important substitute for short term bank loans.6 Given 
that substitutions between bank and nonbank debt may involve substitutions 
across maturities, two additional mix variables are constructed adding the long 
term equivalents of the mix components. In this manner, DBRI is the ratio of total 
bank debt to the sum of this debt plus total bonds and total other debt. Finally, 
DBR3 adds trade debt to the denominator of DBR!. 
Table 4 presents the average of the different financing mix variables for all sectors 
in the sample. For the ratios not including trade debt (DBR! and DBR2), the 
manufacturing sector has the highest proportion of bank loans whereas the 
services sector has the lowest. Including trade debt varies the relation between 
sectors, with the agricultural and services having the highest levels of DBR3, due 
to relatively low values of trade debt. As expected, the manufacturing industry 
nas the lowest values of DBR3 and DBR4. 
i lyIeltzer (1960), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and OHneT and Rudebusch (1995). 
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4.3. Variation Across Time 
�1�� � �������b��_ 
categories and the total (Table 5). The two main debt ratios, DBRI and DBR2, 
together with the number of firms are represented in each graph. Once again one 
observes a very similar behavior between the different debt mix variables of small 
and medium firms across time, although throughout the nineties the debt ratios of 
the medium sized firms declined up to 10 percentage point with respect to those 
of the small firms. The debt ratios of the largest firms, on the other hand, have 
shown a continuous decline over the fourteen year period with a narrowing of the 
gap between the short term and total debt ratios, as the percentage of short term 
hank loans decreased. Consistently, across all categories as well as for the total, a 
sharp decline in all debt ratios is observed in 1991. This steep fall may be the 
reflection of the 1989-1990 credit crunch since it is also observed in the debt mix 
constructed using aggregate data (Hernando, 1998). 
5. Monetary Policy and the Debt Mix 
This section examines the movements in different mix variables to assess whether 
monetary policy directly constrains the supply of bank lending. As a measure of 
the monetary policy, the intervention rate is used (Figure 2). To preview the 
results, an increase in the intervention rate is found to negatively affect all debt 
ratios and is specially significant for the broader definitions. In addition, the effect 
on large firms can be clearly differentiated from that on small and medium sized 
firms, the effect on the former ones being positive and significant. These findings 
confirm previous results by Hernando (1998) and provide additional information 
as to the distributional effects of the bank lending channel of monetary policy. 
Table 6 presents the results of estimating a simplified version of (4) which does 
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not include the interaction terms. All estimates presented use data in first 
differences in order to eliminate firm fixed effects. In addition all regressions 
include dummy variables for the years 1989-1991 in order to control for the credit 
crunch episode between July 1989 and December 1990, with its effects possibly 
continuing to be reflected in the 1991 balance sheets. 7 
Under a bank lending channel the various measures of mix are expected to 
decline in response to a monetary contraction. As shown in Table 6 both DBR2 
and the broader measure DBR1 decline after an increase in the intervention rate, 
yet the decline is significant only for the ratio which includes short and long term 
debt. The marginal significance levels of the monetary policy coefficients for 
DBR2 and DBR1 are 0.65 and 0.00 respectively. This differential impact 
exemplifies how misleading conclusions may be reached when narrow measures 
of the finance mix are used. Oliner and Rudebusch (1995, 1996) emphasize the 
possibility that evidence in favor of the bank credit channel may be found using a 
narrow definition when in fact the actual mix of bank and nonbank debt does not 
change. The results presented above indicate that the opposite situation may also 
occur - utilizing a very narrow definition of total debt which does not include the 
most relevant bank substitutes can also lead to misleading results. In the eBBE 
sample, bank loans represent 100% of total short term loans for nearly 76% of the 
observations and for an additional 6% of the observations they represent over 
90% of total short term loans, leaving small room for manoeuver when faced with 
a monetary contraction unless substitution across maturities is allowed. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 show the effect of a monetary tightening on the debt 
mix when trade debt is included as a possible alternative to bank loans. 
Differences would support the theory originally proposed by Meltzer that trade 
debt extended by large firms could buffer any fall in bank lending to small firms. 
7 Figure 1 shows the gradual decline of the bank debt ratios until 1991, more pronounced for the 
largest firms, with a sharp drop this last year. The dummy variable for 1991 avoids capturing this 
effect in the interest rate coefficient. 
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Adding trade debt to the financing mix variable defined using both short and 
long term debt does not modify the previous results. This is not the case however 
for the mix defined only using short term debt. Whereas DBR2 is unresponsive to 
changes in monetary policy, once trade debt is included, the response to a 
monetary tightening is negative and significant. Once again the dangers of using 
very narrow definitions of the debt mix are made evident. Firms appear to try to 
offset reductions in short term bank loans with increases in trade debt, clearly 
indicating a reduction in bank loans supply rather than loan demand. This result 
is consistent with Hernandez and Hernando (1998) which found trade credit to 
increase during recessions, periods typically associated with greater difficulty in 
obtaining external funds.8•9 
In the definition of bank loans the Central Balance Office includes commercial 
credit lines. Given the special nature of these credit lines, the above results are 
reproduced excluding this portion of bank loans for the subsample of firms and 
years (1992-1996) for which this information is available. The conclusions 
extracted from Table 6 are unaffected, in fact, the coefficient on the monetary 
• The authors however do not find any effect of monetary policy on the amount of trade debt 
made available by firms. They attribute this result to annual periodicity of the data as well as to 
limitations of the monetary policy indicators used (intervention rate and monetary conditions 
indicator). A better indicator would have been intervention rate innovations. 
9 Inclusion of a lag of the monetary policy variable does not modify the previous results and itself is 
not significant, except in the case of the mix variables including trade debt. When the lagged change 
in the intervention rate is included the sign of the current change is reversed for both DBR3 and DBR4 
and the effect of the lagged. change is negative. The coefficients are Significant only for the short term 
financing mix (DBR4). This result is in part due to the change in the sample composition when firms 
with less than four observations are eliminated. In the complete sample 22% of the observations 
correspond to medium sized firms and 7% to large firms. When only firms with more than four 
observations are used the percentage of medium and large firms increase to 25% and 9% respectively. 
The increase is especiaUy evident during the initial years. In 1985 and 1986 for example the 
percentage of medium size firms increases by nearly ten percentage point and the percentage of large 
increases by over 50 percent 
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policy variable increases in absolute value and is significant both for DBRl and 
DBR2.1o 
Taking first differences of equation (4) results in the following regression model 
t.(B/D), � jlo (t. MP,) + p, (MP, ·Z,,· MP'·1· Z ".1) + V" 
where V it = E it - E it-I. Note that the second expression on the right includes both 
changes in monetary policy and in the vector of firm characteristics. This term can 
be rewritten as .1MPt* Z it + MP t_I*.1Z it which permits a clearer interpretation of 
the differential effects of monetary policy on firms with varying degrees of access 
to capital markets and on firms whose degree of access changes from one period 
to the next. Tables 7 and 8 present the results of estimating the above equation for 
different indicators of capital market access without restricting the coefficients on 
the terms of the decomposition to be equal. 
Table 7 presents the results using as proxies for access to capital markets dummy 
variables for the different size categories defined by the Central Balance Sheet 
Office.ll Once again the results are consistent with the existence of a bank credit 
channel. The effect of a monetary tightening is significantly negative for the small 
firms across all financing mix definitions, with the largest decline being observed 
for DBRI and the smallest for DBR2. The effect on medium and large firms is 
clearly smaller although its size varies according to the definition of the debt mix. 
For' the medium sized firms, all debt ratios decline in response to a monetary 
tightening, except DBR2 in which case a monetary tightening has no impact on 
the percentage of short term bank loans. The small difference between small and 
10 dbr1·" -.0439 _ .0058 inter. Number of observations: 23,147 
(.0011) 
dbr2- = -.0589 - .00751 inter. Number of observations: 19,199 
(.0013) 
U Size}: Total Workers < 100 
Size2; 100 s; Total Workers<500 
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medium firms arises from the positive and significant effect of the second 
component of the interaction term which captures the change in the size of the 
firms. The effect of monetary policy on the largest firms, on the other hand, is 
markedly different - not only does an increase in the intervention rate have a 
positive effect on the debt ratio of these firms, but also the effect of monetary 
policy on firms increasing in size is positive for both the total and short term debt 
mix variables. The same pattern is observed when trade debt is included in the 
debt ratio, although the increase in the ratio of bank to nonbank funds due to a 
monetary tightening is larger for these. In sum, the effect of monetary policy on 
the financing mix of firms is clearly different amongst small and large firms. This 
suggest that banks appear to prefer channeling their funds to their !Tbest" clients 
when tightening of monetary policy leads to a decrease of loanable funds. 
Given that the size variable may not be the best proxy for access to capital 
markets, the above analysis is repeated using different indicators of the 
availability to firms of alternative sources of funds. The different proxies used in 
Table 8 are partial foreign or financial intermediary ownership, registration in the 
stock exchange, dividend distribution, and use of commercial paper. As will be 
mentioned later, some of these, as well as size face possible endogeneity 
problems. A final estimation includes a distinction between public and non-public 
sector firms where the former are not expected to be affected by a monetary 
tightening. The impact of monetary tightening is reestimated taking into account 
the different characteristics individually and including the 1989-1991 dummy 
variables in all cases. 
The main conclusion extracted from an overview of Table 8 is that although a 
monetary tightening continues to have a significantly negative impact on all debt 
ratios except DBR2, yet the differential impact across firms is not present for all 
indicators of capital access. In particular, firms with ties to financial 
Size3: Total Workers<:=500 
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intermediaries (KFin) or firms with ties to foreign firms (KExt) do not respond 
differently to firms with none of these ties. As can be seen in the first panel of 
Table 8, only the short term bank ratio (DBR2) responds positively to an increase 
in the intervention rate when firms are partially owned by financial 
intermediaries. The short term debt ratio of firms without such ownership does 
not respond to a monetary tightening. The same pattern is observed for firms with 
foreign capital (panel B) although the significance level of the coefficient on the 
interaction term is slighter lower. Panel C presents the results comparing firms 
quoted on the stock exchange to the rest. Monetary policy has a significantly 
negative effect on the debt ratios of firms not quoted on the stock exchange while 
the effect on firms with access to capital markets, as proxied by quotation on the 
stock exchange, is positive and Significant. Those firms with the lowest 
information asymmetry problems obtain a higher percentage of bank loans 
during periods of monetary tightening. This result is consistent with the existence 
of a credit channel. Note also that these firms correspond almost entirely to the 
"large" firms in the previous table.12 
The next two panels use as proxies for access to capital markets the use by firms 
of commercial paper (PAG) and the distribution of dividends (DlV). These two 
indicators are probably the most prone to endogeneity problems given that the 
availability of bank loans probably conditions the use of commercial paper and 
the distribution of dividends. In Panel D, the effect of monetary policy on the debt 
ratio of firms that do not use commercial paper is largely nonsignificant yet it is 
significantly positive when trade debt is included in the short term ratio (DBR4). 
These results are clearly different from all previous ones. Furthermore, it appears 
that the effect of high interest rates on firms that become commercial paper users 
is to reduce the debt ratios. In addition to possible endogeneity, a problem with 
this indicator is that commercial paper data is available only for a subsample of 
firms and years which precludes its inclusion in the debt ratios as a possible 
12 The average total personnel for firms quoted on the stock market is 2,157 while for those not 
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alternative to bank loans. Results in Panel E indicate that for firms which do not 
distribute dividends, a tightening of monetary policy has a significantly negative 
effect on the various debt ratios. In addition, high interest rates further reduce the 
percentage of bank loans for firms who change their dividend distribution status. 
Finally, Panel F compares the effect of monetary policy on public and nonpublic 
firms. The second row coefficients show that, as expected, debt ratios of public 
firms are not affected by monetary tightening. However high interest rates lead to 
an increase in the proportion of bank loans for firms which become public, a 
result not surprising if public sector firms are considered to have less 
informational asymmetry problems. If this comparison is done by estimating the 
simple regression (4), without interaction terms, on two different subsamples, 
public and non public, the monetary policy coefficient is negative for both 
subsamples yet it is significant only for the nonpublic firms for DBRI and DBR4. 
For the short term debt ratio DBR2 monetary policy has no effect in either case. 
For DBR3 on the other hand the monetary policy coefficient is significantly 
negative for both types of firms. 
The use of different proxies for the access to capital markets other than size, which 
has been much criticized, did not produce in this case any new and different 
conclusions. Size defined by the number of workers appears to be a good proxy 
for greater availability of funds for firms in the eBBE with the added benefit of 
being the proxy least prone to endogeneity problems.13 Table 9 presents estimates 
of the effects of the different proxies on the debt ratios when all are taken into 
account simultaneously. The only significant dummy variables are those that 
indicate the use of commercial paper and dividend distribution. In both cases, the 
effect on the percentage of bank loans is negative and significant. 
quoted the average is 209. 
II Theoretically, the number of employees is determined by the firm's production function and 
available technology. Thus, whether or not a firm obtains a bank loan is more likely to directly 
affect its need for foreign capital or flotation on the stock market than the number of employees. A 
firm's financial viability may also affect plant size but this effect is less direct. 
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5.1. Other Determinants of Financial Mix 
When a matrix of additional explanatory variables Xit is included in the simple 
regression model (4) without interaction terms as an alternative way to control for 
specific firm determinants of the optimal debt mix, the negative effect on the debt 
ratios of an increase in the intervention rate continues to hold. As seen in the first 
column of Table 10, the monetary policy coefficient is significant and negative in a 
least squares estimate. The additional variables included are the percentage of 
fixed asset (INMAq as a proxy for net worth, the percentage of liquid assets 
(LIQAS) as a proxy for debt alternatives and dummy variables for financial 
intermediary capital (DKFlN), foreign ownership (DKEXT) and quotation on the 
stock market (COTIZ). Of these additional variables only the first two are 
significant and have the expected sign. A firm with a higher net worth has less 
information asymmetry problems and thus can more easily obtain funds in capital 
markets. On the other hand a higher percentage of liquid assets represents a 
source of alternative funds since these assets can be easily converted to cash. The 
estimated coefficients however may be severely biased due to the presence of 
autocorrelated residuals. A possible solution is to instrument the two balance 
sheet variables, .6.INMAC and .1LIQAS, in order to ensure independence of the 
residuals. In the second colurrm, the results are shown for the IV estimates of the 
same equation using the levels of INMAC and LIQAS lagged two periods as 
instruments. Results are largely unchanged. The coefficient on the change of the 
intervention rate remains the same, while the coefficients on the balance sheet 
variables change only slightly. These results should be reassuring as to the correct 
interpretation of the interest rate coefficient. 
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6. Conclusions 
Previous shortcomings of empirical work on the bank lending channel have been 
slowly overcome, yet the evidence continues to be inconclusive and skeptics still 
abound. The latest unresolved shortcoming refers to the interpretation of results 
based on firm data aggregates. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) resolved the 
initial identification problem by estimating the impact of monetary policy on the 
ratio of bank to nonbank debt under the assumption that the traditional interest 
channel equally affects the demand for bank and nonbank loans. Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1995) raised the issue of possible misinterpretation of aggregate 
results due to firm heterogeneity. A reduction of the aggregate debt mix is 
consistent with either an operative lending channel or with a transfer of all funds 
away from small firms towards large firms, less dependent on bank loans. Their 
results support the latter interpretation. The criticism directed at Kashyap, Stein 
and Wilcox, however, can also be applied to the Oliner and Rudebusch evidence 
since by constructing aggregates for small and large firms the authors are not 
taking into account other types of firm heterogeneity and, moreover, they 
implicitly assume that the only difference between small and large firms is their 
access to capital markets. 
This paper represents an attempt to improve the empirical analysis of the narrow 
crecFt channel by controlling for firm specific heterogeneity when estimating the 
effect of monetary policy on the debt mix using a panel of individual firms. 
Using a data set of 12,909 Spanish firms provided by the Central Balance Sheet 
Office of the Bank of Spain, the estimates obtained are strongly supportive of the 
existence of a bank lending channel during the 1983-1996 period. Monetary 
contractions during the period reduced the supply of bank loans relative to 
nonbank loans as evidenced by the significantly negative effect of an increase in 
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the intervention rate on the financing mix of all firms. Furthermore, a differential 
impact of monetary policy is observed across firms according to their access to 
public capital markets, proxied by employee size. For small and medium sized 
firms, a monetary contraction leads to a decrease of the percentage of bank loans, 
yet for large firms the opposite occurs - large firms increase their relative bank 
financing in response to a tighter monetary policy. This suggests, as predicted by 
the informational asymmetry theory behind the credit channel, that banks appear 
to prefer channeling their funds to their "best" clients when tightening of 
monetary policy leads to a decrease of loanable funds. 
The use of different proxies for the access to capital markets besides size, much 
used and widely criticized in the literature, did not produce any new and 
different conclusions. Size defined by the number of workers appeared to be a 
good proxy for greater availability of funds for firms in the eBBE with the added 
benefit of being the proxy least prone to endogeneity problems. 
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Table 1 Structure of the Panel 
Year Number of Firms 
1983 2199 
1984 3147 
1985 3843 
1986 4743 
1987 5508 
1988 5559 
1989 5412 
1990 5178 
1991 5147 
1992 5310 
1993 5469 
1994 5776 
1995 5709 
1996 4216 
Balance of the Panel 
No. of Time 
Series Observ. No. of Firms No. Observ. % 
2 3392 6784 10.09 
3 2309 6927 10.31 
4 1569 6276 9.34 
5 1 1 80 5900 8.78 
6 952 5712 8.50 
7 626 4382 6.52 
8 526 4208 6.26 
9 435 3915 5.82 
1 0  461 4610 6.86 
1 1  368 4048 6.02 
12 266 3192 4.75 
1 3  288 3744 5.57 
14 537 7518 1 1 .1 8  
Total 12909 67216 100.00 
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Table 2 Sectoral Composition 
Sector Description No. Observ. Percentage 
1 Fuel Mineral Extraction 310 0.46 
2 Other Mineral Extraction 362 0.54 
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 6335 9.42 
4 Petroleum 108 0.16 
5 Chemical Industry 3957 5.89 
6 Other Mineral Industries 2563 3.81 
7 Fabricated Metals 2520 3.75 
8 Nonelectric Machinery 2795 4.16 
9 Electric Machinery and Electr. 2237 3.33 
10 Automobiles 1749 2.60 
1 1  Apparel and Textile 3468 5.16 
1 2  Leather and Footwear 950 1.41 
13 Lumber 940 1.40 
14 Paper and Printing 2491 3.71 
15 Rubber and Plastics 1607 2.39 
16 Other Manufacturing 1684 2.S1 
17 Electricity Prod. and Oistrib. 772 1 . 1 5  
1 8  Water Production and Oistrib. 526 0.78 
1 9  Construction 3750 5.58 
20 Trade 15583 23.18 
21 Transport and Communications 3262 4.85 
22 Agriculture 990 1.47 
23 Fishery 318 0.47 
24 Hotel and Catering 1525 2.27 
25 Real Estate 5353 7.96 
26 Other Services 1061 1.58 
Total 67216 100.00 
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Table 4 Sectoral Debt Ratios 1983 - 1 996 
0.5488 0.6571 0.3263 0.2549 
0.7858 0.8838 0.4011 0.3671 
0.8230 0.9168 0.4968 0.4547 
0.8436 0.9287 0.4846 0.4326 
0.8583 0.9455 0.4430 0.4082 
0.8323 0.9133 0.4533 0.4237 
0.8167 0.8967 0.4309 0.3905 
0.8892 0.9465 0.5263 0.4926 
0.8942 0.9402 0.4694 0.4427 
0.8756 0.9385 0.5065 0.4382 
0.8319 0.9238 0.4654 0.4027 
0.8467 0.9294 0.4916 0.4534 
0.6176 0.8449 0.4642 0.2963 
0.8277 0.8903 0.4429 0.3721 
0.8261 0.9025 0.3815 0.3336 
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Table 5 Debt Ratios - Yearly Average 
Year No. ofObs. DBR1 DBR2 DBR3 DBR4 
1983 2199 0.7872 0.9474 0.4654 0.4020 
1 984 3147 0.8296 0.9561 0.5013 0.4680 
1 985 3843 0.8343 0.9564 0.4899 0.4501 
1 986 4743 0.8384 0.9546 0.4798 0.4361 
1987 5508 0.8273 0.9448 0.4648 0.4216 
1988 5559 0.8276 0.9333 0.4553 0.4021 
1989 5412 0.8232 0.9283 0.4569 0.3984 
1990 5178 0.8181 0.9107 0.4607 0.4028 
1991 5147 0.7487 0.7852 0.4426 0.3859 
1992 5310 0.7651 0.8420 0.4607 0.4079 
1993 5469 0.7744 0.8447 0.4612 0.3997 
1994 5776 0.7874 0.8532 0.4579 0.3815 
1995 5709 0.7830 0.8505 0.4573 0.3773 
1996 4216 0.7673 0.8398 0.4445 0.3667 
- 3 1 -
Rate -0.0030 •• 
(0.0005) 
0.0074 · 
(0.0040) 
0.0040 
(0.0038) 
-0.0510 .. 
(0.0030) 
0.0040 
0.2404 
54307 
I were i i 
-0.0002 -0.0020 •• 
(0.0005) (0.0004) 
-0.0064 0.0133 .. 
(0.0040) (0.0030) 
-0.0095 •• 0.0112 .. 
(0.0037) (0.0030) 
-0.0860 .* -0.0016 
(0.0036) (0.0030) 
0.0120 0.0006 
0.2065 0.2068 
0.45388 54307 
1984·1996. 089-091 are dummy variables for the years 1989-1991 . 
.. 5% si9nificance level; • 10% significance level. 
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-0.0020 •• 
(0.0005) 
0.0135 *. 
(0.0040) 
0.0135 ·* 
(0.0036) 
-0.0025 
(0.0036) 
0.0005 
0.2235 
52150 
Table 7 Differential Effect of Monetary Policy on Debt Mix According to Size 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
DBR1 DBR2 DBR3 OBR4 
Intervention Rate ·0.0036 •• -0.0011 • -0.0023 .... -0.0022 .... 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Size2"alntervention Rate 0.0004 0.0011 0.0003 -0.0005 
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Intervention Rate"6Size2 0.0012 .o. 0.0010 ... 0.0014 .o. 0.0017 .. 
(0.0005) (0.0049) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Size3" alntervenlion Rate 0.0047 ." 0.0054 •• 0.0001 0.0036 ". 
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Intervention Rate"6Size3 0.0012 0.0021 "* 0.0024 "* 0.0025 •• 
(0.0098) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0005) 
089 0.0077 .. -0.0059 0.0134 - 0.0136 ..  
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0040) 
090 0.0043 -0.0095 ". 0.0112 ". 0.0135 "" 
(0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0036) 
091 -0.0514 .. " -0.0862 •• -0.0015 -0.0025 
(0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0037) 
Adj. R2 0.0044 0.0125 0.0008 0.0009 
RMSE 0.2404 0.2065 0.2067 0.2235 
No. of Observations 54307 45388 54307 52150 
All regressions were estimated USing ordinary least SQuares on first differences for the penod 
1984-1996. Size2: 100:s Total Workers < 500; Size3: Total Workers 2:: 500; 089·091 are dummy 
variables for the years 1989·1991. .. 5% significance level; .. 10% significance level. 
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Table 8 Differential Effect of Monetary Policy on Debt Mix 
According to Firm Characteristics 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
DBR1 DBR2 DBR3 
Panel A 
61ntervention Rate -0.0031 .. -0.0004 -0.0021 .. 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
61ntervention Rate·Kfin 0.0027 0 0042 •• 0.0010 
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
6KFin·lntervention Rate 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
No. of observations 54307 45388 54307 
Panel B 
61ntervention Rate -0.0032 .. -0.0006 -0.0023 .. 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
..... Intervention RateKext 0.0011 0.001 9 · 0.0015 
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) 
..... KExt·lntervention Rate -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0008 • 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
No. of observations 54307 45388 54307 
Panet C 
..... Intervention Rate -0.0031 .. -0.0004 -0.0022 •• 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
..... Intervention Rate*Cotiz 0.0076 .. 0.0101 •• 0.0071 •• 
(0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0026) 
..... Cotiz·lntervention Rate -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0097 • 
(0.0012) (0.00 1 1 )  (0.0010) 
No. of observations 54307 45388 54307 
Panel 0 
..... Intervention Rate -0.0013 · 0.0001 -0.0003 
(0.0068) (0 0006) (0.0006) 
..... Intervention Rate·Pag 0.0080 0.0037 0.0056 
(0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
6Pag·lntervention Rate -0.0081 .. -0.0133 •• -0.0036 •• 
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
No. of observations 34763 29191 34763 
Panel E 
t!.lntervention Rate -0.0030 v -0.0005 -0.0018 .. 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
6.lntervention RateOiv 0.0000 0.0008 -0.0010 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
6.0iv*lntervention Rate -0.0054 .. -0.0004 • -0.0015 ·* 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
No. of observations 54307 45388 54307 
Panel F 
t!.lntervention Rate -0.0030 .. -0.0004 -0.001 9 ·· 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
t!.lntervention Rate'Publ -00005 0.0027 -0.0017 
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0014) 
6.Publ"lntervention Rate 0.0028 •• 0.0057 0.0027 .. 
(0.0012) (0 0012) (0.001 1 )  
No. o f  observations 54307 45388 54307 
DBR4 
-0.0021 .. 
(0.0005) 
0.0018 
(0.0019) 
0.0014 • 
(0.0008) 
52150 
-0.0022 u 
(0.0005) 
0.0012 
(0.0010) 
-0.0004 
(00005) 
52150 
-0.0022 .. 
(0.0005) 
0.0115 
(0.0028) 
-0.0018 
(0.0011)  
52150 
0.001 3 ·· 
(0.0007) 
0.0088 • 
(0.0049) 
-0.0044 .. 
(0.0009) 
33406 
-0.0016 ·' 
(0.0005) 
-0.0014 · 
(0.0009) 
-0 0014 •• 
(0.0002) 
52150 
-0.0021 .. 
(0.0005) 
0.0010 
(0.0017) 
0.0031 .. 
(0.0012) 
52150 
All regressions were estimated uSing ordinary least squares on first differences, Inc!udlng dummy 
variables for the years 1989,1990 and 1991. AI! panels were estimated for the period 1984-1996 
except panel 0 (data on commercial paper use is only available starting in 1991 for firms which 
complete the extended questionnaire, i.e. larger firms). 
KFin, KExt. Cotiz, Pag, Div, Publ: dummy variables for financial intermediary capital, foreign 
ownership, quotation on the stock market, use of commercial paper. distribution of dividends and 
public ownership . .. 5% significance level; · 10% significance level. 
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6 DKFin 
6 0KExt 
6 0Cotiz 
6 0KPubi 
6 DPag 
6 00iv 
Adj. R2 
RMSE 
Table 9 Access to Capital Markets and Debt Ratios 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
DBRl OBR2 DBR3 
0.0158 0.0107 0.Q165 
(0.0132) (0.0121) (0.0115) 
0.0053 0.0124 -0.0069 
(0.0084) (0.0076) (0.0073) 
0.0060 0.0102 -0.0131 
(0.0152) (0.0140) (0.0132) 
0.0313 0.0336 * 0.0273 
(0.0209) (0.0188) (0.0183) 
-0.1138 ** -0.1848 ** -0.0476 ** 
(0.0125) (0.01 1 1 )  (0.0109) 
-0.0069 * -0.0008 -0.0241 ** 
(0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0031) 
0.0026 0.0096 0.0024 
0.2395 0.2063 0.2089 
No. of Observations 34763 29191 34763 
OBR4 
0.0214 
(0.0127) 
0.0025 
(0.0081 )  
-0.0055 
(0.0147) 
0.0439 ** 
(0.0202) 
-0.0608 ** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0221 ** 
(0.0034) 
0.0022 
0.2261 
33406 
All regressIOns were estimated uSing ordmary least squares on first differences for the penod 
1992-1996 (data on use of commercial paper is only available starting in 1991 for firms that answer 
the complete questionnaire, i.e. larger firms). 
DKFin, OKExt, DCotiz, DPag, OOiv. OPubl: dummy variables for capital of financial intermediaries. 
foreign ownership. quotation on the stock markel, use of commercial paper. distribution of dividends 
and public ownership. 
** 5% significance level; • 10% Significance level. 
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Table 1 0  Monetary Policy and Other Determinants of the Debt Mix 
Dependent Variable : 6 0BR1 
(standard errors in parenthesis) 
OLS IV 
"Intervention Rate -0.0014 ** -0.0013 *" 
(0.0006) (0.0007) 
089 0.0079 • 0.0054 
(0.0046) (0.0051) 
090 0.0058 0.0048 
(0.0040) (0.0042) 
091 -0.0489 .. -0.0493 *" 
(0.0040) (0.0045) 
" inmac -0.1619 ** -0.2061 * 
(0.0014) (0.1065) 
6 1iqas -0.0967 ** -0.1947 ** 
(0.0075) (0.0527) 
6 DKfin 0.0126 -0.0083 
(0.0127) (0.0164) 
6 DKExt -0.0058 0.0059 
(0.0078) (0.0085) 
6 DCotiz -0.0050 -0.0043 
(0.0140) (0.0145) 
Adj. R2 0.010 
RMSE 0.2308 0.2384 
No. of Observations 41397 41397 
All regressions were estimated uSing either ordinary least squares or IV on first differences for 
the period 1985-1996. 089-091 are dummy variables for the years 1989-1991. 
Instruments used in the IV estimates: real sales and percentage of fixed assets and liquid assets, all 
lagged two periods. ** 5% Significance level: * 10% Significance level. 
6 inmac, 6 liqas, 6oKfin, 6oKExt, 6oCotiz: first difference of percentage of fixed assets, percentage of 
liquid assets, and dummy variables for financial intermediary capital, foreign ownership and quotation of 
the stock market. 
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Figure 1 Annual Mean Debt Ratios 
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